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Obscene Contracts:
The Doctrine of Unconscionability and
Hospital Billing of the Uninsured
George A. Nation III'
I. INTRODUCTION
A HEADLINE in a national newspaper reads: "Full Price: A Young Woman,
EXAn Appendectomy, And a $I9,OOO Debt."2 The story concerned
Rebekah Nix, a twenty-five-year-old college graduate and former maga-
zine fact checker who spent two days in New York Methodist Hospital in
Brooklyn for an appendectomy.3 She was billed $19,000: $14,000 for the
hospital stay and $5,000 for physician's fees. 4
There is nothing surprising about the fact that medical services are ex-
pensive. What is shocking is that services are much more expensive for
patients like Ms. Nix who are uninsured. While Ms. Nix's bill was $14,000,
New York Methodist is reimbursed only about $2,5oo by health mainte-
nance organizations ("HMOs") for the same two-day hospital stay!5
Unfortunately, Ms. Nix's story is not unusual. Consider the case of Mr.
Shipman, a forty-three-year-old former furniture salesman from Herndon,
Virginia.6 He experienced severe chest pain one night and was taken by
I Professor of Law and Business at Lehigh University. As a general definition of the word
obscene Black's offers "Objectionable or offensive to accepted standards of decency." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 971 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, generally "obscene contracts" are those that are
objectionable or offensive to accepted standards of decency. The legal doctrine most often
used to prevent enforcement of such contracts is unconscionability. However, to determine
whether a specific contract is unconscionable is difficult because the doctrine, like obscenity,
is described in broad and general terms. As Justice Stewart noted, obscenity is tough to define,
"[blut I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. State of Ohio 378 U.S. 184, 194 0964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)-so too with unconscionable contracts, exact definition is elusive but you know
them when you see them-and hospital admission contracts that require uninsured patients
to pay the hospital's "full charges" are a case in point.
2 See Lucette Lagnado, Full Price: A Young Woman, An Appendectomy, Anda$p,ooo Debt-
Ms. Nix Confronts Harsh Fact Of Health-Care Economics: Uninsured Are Billed More-Moving In
With Mom at Age 25, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at AI.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill; Uninsured Patients Often Face Big
Markups on SmallItems; 'Rules Are Completely Crazy', WALL ST. J., Sept. Z, 2004 at Bi.
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ambulance to a community hospital emergency room and then to Inova
Fairfax Hospital, where doctors performed a cardiac catheterization and
inserted a stent.7 Mr. Shipman checked himself out of the hospital the
next morning against medical advice, because he lacked health insurance
and was concerned about the expense.' He was right to be concerned.
Mr. Shipman's two-day health crisis left him with a $37,000 medical bill.9
However, the same services Mr. Shipman received would have been re-
imbursed by Medicaid at $7,065 and by Medicare at $16,047. '0 Obviously
the fact that Ms. Nix and Mr. Shipman are expected to pay for the medical
services they received is not surprising or unreasonable." What is shocking
and unfair is that in each case the hospital would have accepted a fraction
of the amount Mr. Shipman and Ms. Nix were expected to pay if the payor
were Medicaid, Medicare, an HMO, or a private insurer.2 In effect, hospi-
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
io Id.
I I Even a patient who is in an emergency situation and unconscious at the time of re-
ceiving medical services is obligated to pay for the services under the equitable doctrine of
unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Eagle v. Snyder, 6o4 A.2d 253, 270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (quoting
Husik v. Lever, 95 Pa. Super. 258, 26o (1928) ("In the absence of an express agreement as to
amount, the law implies a promise to pay for a physician's services as much as they are rea-
sonably worth."); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CorArcrs § 19 (3d ed. 199o) ("To
avoid unjust enrichment, the law permits the party who has conferred the benefit to recover
the reasonable value of the benefit."); JOHN D. CAL.mARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CorArrCTs § 1-12 (2d ed. 1977) (citing Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1953)) ("[I]f a
physician gives a child necessary medical care in the face of parental neglect, the physician
may recover from the parents, in quasi contract, the value of his services.").
However, the unconscious patient has a distinct advantage over uninsured patients such
as Ms. Nix or Mr. Shipman, because under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the unconscious
patient is only obligated to pay the reasonable value of the service received, whereas unin-
sured patients are liable to pay many times the reasonable value of the service they receive.
SeeTemple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 5o8-11 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003) (stating that, after their contract expired, Healthcare's subscribers continued
to receive medical services at Temple. Temple billed Healthcare at its published rates or
full charges for such services. The court held that Temple had a right to be paid the reason-
able value of its services under a theory of unjust enrichment. However, the court held that
Temple's full or published charges were not reasonable because they were paid by only one
to three percent of patients.).
12 See Lucette Lagnado, Medical Mark Up: California Hospitals Open Books, Showing Huge
Price Differences; State Law Requires Disclosing Charges for Goods, Services; Big Bills for Uninsured;
Why a Leech Retails for $8S, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2oo4, at AI ("List prices are usually charged
only to uninsured patients. Health plans negotiate big discounts and the government essen-
tially dictates what it will pay."). The reasons for this are the result of the current third party
reimbursement system. Each hospital maintains a "charge master" or list of its retail or "full
charge" prices for every good or service offered by the hospital. See Mark H. Gallant and John
R. Washlick, Charity Care and Patient Discounts ... Love or Corruption?, in LOVE OR CORRUVrION:
How OR WHEN CAN HOSPITALS DISCOUNT THEIR "USUAL CHARGES"? 1 (2004) [hereinafter Love
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tals are engaged in an odd sort of price discrimination.'3 The amount the
or Corruption]. The charge masters are updated frequently to capture price increases. Id. The
systems and methods for creating a charge master are non-standardized among hospital sys-
tems and hospitals. Id. Even within a hospital system each hospital's charge master may be
different, reflecting different prices or different items. Id. However, only the uninsured are
expected to pay these "full charges" or "list prices," because all of the third party payors pay
less. Id. at 1-2. Under Medicare, the federal program for the elderly and disabled, the hospital
receives a flat rate based on the diagnosis for all care, including drugs. See Lagnado, supra.
Medicaid, the federal-state program for the poor, pays a negotiated amount, see id., which
varies from state to state. See Love or Corruption, supra. ("Medicare/Medicaid typically dic-
tates payment levels for 40-60% of patients .... Why haven't hospitals heavily discounted fees
to the 'uninsured?'... [Blecause tiered charges are impractical administratively, pose issues
under federal rules requiring uniform charges, and charge reductions can significantly under-
mine revenues under percentage of charge contracts."). "Health-maintenance organizations
pay about 60% of the list price." Lagnado, supra. Commercial insurers also pay negotiated
rates, which are contractually discounted. Id.; see also Temple, 832 A.zd at 506. (In concluding
that the hospital's published rates exceeded the reasonable value of its services, the court
stated: "[in other words, ninety-four percent of the time, the Hospital received less than
eighty percent of the Hospital's published rates."). The court in Temple also noted that the
hospital's "full published charges in 1994 were approximately 172% of its actual costs, while
in 1995 and 1996, the published rates were approximately 300% of its actual costs," and "that
private payors typically paid 1 21% of the cost of hospital services in 1994, 119% in 1995, and
112% in 1996," while "[Medicare and Medicaid] generally pay less." Id. at 509.
In addition to the uninsured, tortfeasors/automobile insurance and liability carriers may
reimburse medical expenses based on the hospital's full charges, though this has been criti-
cized. Seegenerally William R. Jones, Jr.,Managed Car and the Tort System: Are We PayingBillions
In Phantom Healthcare Charges?, ARiz. ATTY., at 28 March 1996 (critiquing this practice and
suggesting reforms).
13 See Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REv. 317, 327,
354,366, n.323 (2002) (discussing price discrimination as charging different prices to different
customers for the same goods or services and arguing that price discrimination is unconscio-
nable).
The following quote from the article concerning Shipman is telling.
Mr. Shipman negotiated a discount from at least one physician involved
in his care. Joseph Kiernan, a cardiologist who practices at Inova Fairfax,
billed Mr. Shipman $6,8oo, but when the Shipmans told him they
couldn't afford to pay that much, he slashed some $3,000 off the bill,
bringing it down to about $3,8oo. That is still more than what big gov-
ernment payers such as Virginia Medicaid would have paid. A spokes-
man for the state agency says it would have reimbursed the physician
slightly over $i,ooo; Medicare says it would have paid about $900. "We
feel that patients should be somewhat responsible for the medical
costs," Dr. Kiernan says. For uninsured patients who are uninsured but
not indigent, "we come up with a compromise solution."
Lagnado, supra note 4.
The physician is involved in price discrimination-charging more to customers that he
perceives as being able to pay the premium charge. In addition to the obvious profit maximi-
zation incentive to engage in price discrimination, there also appears to be a "cost shifting"
incentive present in healthcare. For example, Jeff Laramie, owner of the ambulance company
that transported Mr. Shipman, stated that, "[pirivate payers generally pay along the lines of
70% to 8o% of the charges... [and] charges are high to compensate for low reimbursements
2005- 2oo6 ]
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hospital is willing to accept for its goods and services varies depending on
who the patient is, or more precisely, on the identity of the payor.
14
Ms. Nix and Mr. Shipman represent the common fate suffered by the
45 million uninsured Americans when they receive medical treatment; they
are billed at the hospital's "regular rates," "full charges," or "list prices."'s
These charges are generally at least double and may be up to eight times
what the hospital would accept as payment in full for the same services
from Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs, or private insurers.' 6 The labels for these
charges, "regular, .... full," or "list," are misleading, because in fact they are
actually paid by less than five percent of patients nationally.'7 Moreover,
medical bills are now a leading cause of personal bankruptcies.' As a result,
the billing and debt collection practices of hospitals have become a heated
political and social issue.' 9
from the government and other big insurers." Id.
14 See supra note 1o and accompanying text.
15 See generally Lagnado, supra note 2; Lagnado, supra note 6; Love or Corruption, supra
note 12.
16 See Lagnado, supra note 6, at B4 (noting that "Hal Cohen, a health-care consultant
who has studied hospital markups in all fifty states.., says some U.S. hospitals charge as much
as io times their costs."). The same article notes that Shipman was billed more than eight
times the amount that Medicare would have paid for the physician charge. Id.
Unfortunately, the exact predetermined fixed rates paid by managed
care plans are carefully guarded secrets. Our research disclosed that ev-
ery private managed care contract contains a confidentiality provision.
The providers in our locality who would talk to us estimated that one-
third to one-half of all of their patients' bills were paid by some form of
private managed care; and on average, their fixed fee for the services
they rendered to managed care patients was no more than 50 percent of
their billed charges.
Jones, supra note 12, at 29-30; see also Love or Corruption, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that the
national average full charge amount listed on a hospital's charge master equals 345% of the
hospital's costs and that Medicaid and large commercial insurers' reimbursement rates are
often below cost. Thus, if cost is five dollars, the national average full charge would be $17.25
and the hospital would accept as payment in full an amount less than five dollars.).
17 See, e.g.,Vencor, Inc. v. Nat'l States Ins. Co., 303 E3d 1024, 1029 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) ("It
is worth noting that in a world in which patients are covered by Medicare and various other
kinds of medical insurance schemes that negotiate rates with providers, providers' supposed
ordinary or standard rates may be paid by a small minority of patients."); Temple, 832 A.zd at
508 ("[T]he hospital was paid its full published charges in only one to three percent of its
cases."); Lagnado, supra note 12 (noting that almost no one other than the uninsured is asked
to pay list prices).
18 See Lucette Lagnado, Taming Hospital Billing, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at B i (not-
ing that "medical debt has emerged as a leading cause of personal bankruptcy"); World-Wide,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2005, at As (noting that a "Harvard study in the journal Health Affairs
found [that] [mledical bills trigger half of all personal bankruptcies").
19 Moreover, this is likely to continue given the ever increasing cost of health care.
Glenn Menick, a professor of healthcare finance at the University of Southern California ex-
pects health care costs to increase by eight percent to nine percent per year over the next five
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This article argues that the admission agreement between a hospital and
a patient, in which the patient agrees to pay the hospital's "full charges" for
necessary medical services, is unenforceable because it is unconscionable,
and as a result the most that the patient is liable to pay the hospital is the
reasonable value of the medical goods and services received. Moreover,
reasonable value should be defined as the average reimbursement actually
collected, not billed, by the hospital for the diagnostic code that applies to
the medical services received by the patient.20
Part II of this article provides an overview of the doctrine of unconscio-
nability. Part III provides an overview of hospital billing practices, while
part IV discusses case law regarding hospital admission contracts. Part V
analyzes the applicability of the doctrine of unconscionability to hospital
admission agreements, and part VI concludes the article.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY: AN OVERVIEW
A. History of the Doctrine
The doctrine of unconscionability concerns fairness.21 The doctrine can be
used to refuse enforcement of all or part of an agreement that is deemed
by a court to be sufficiently unfair as to be unconscionable.22 The doctrine
years-more than double the expected rate of overall economic growth. See Lagnado, supra
note 12.
2o The court in Temple noted that until 1984, Medicaid reimbursements to hospitals were
based on actual costs. In 1984, due to spiraling health care costs, a new method of payment
was established based on diagnosis rather than length of stay or number of services provid-
ed. Reimbursement amounts are now based on diagnostic related group ("DRG"). Thus, a
patient's diagnosis rather than the actual service provided determines reimbursement. See
Temple, 832 A.2d at 504.
21 See FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 560 (3d ed. 1986)
(noting that courts of equity developed the doctrine of unconscionability to protect victims
of sharp dealing).
22 See, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967). The case involved
a real estate broker who found a buyer for the seller. The seller and buyer entered into a con-
tract for sale, but the contract was never performed due to breach by the buyer. The broker
brought suit against the seller, alleging that, based on the express terms of the listing agree-
ment, the commission was earned upon execution of the contract between buyer and seller.
The court ruled that any contractual provision in the listing agreement that required the seller
to pay the commission even though the buyer of the land was unable to arrange financing
and therefore breached the contract of sale, was "so contrary to the common understanding
of men, and also so contrary to common fairness, as to require a court to condemn it as uncon-
scionable." Id. at 857. In so ruling, the court applied the following reasoning that is equally
applicable to the hospital admission contracts discussed here.
Courts and legislatures have grown increasingly sensitive to imposition,
conscious or otherwise, on members of the public by persons with whom
they deal, who through experience, specialization, licensure, economic
2005- 2oo6 ]
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has a long, if somewhat checkered, history.23 Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen24
is cited as the source of the doctrine in English law.25 In the United States,
the Supreme Court stated in Hepburn v. Dunlop & C0.2 6 that a contract
should be set aside if in conscience it should not be enforced.2 7 In Hume v.
United States,2s the Supreme Court quoted Earl of Chesterfield in noting that
a bargain is unconscionable if it is "such as no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other." 29
The doctrine of unconscionability is recognized in Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.3 Article 2 states:
strength or position, or membership in associations created for their mu-
tual benefit and education, have acquired such expertise or monopolistic
or practical control in the business transaction involved as to give them
an undue advantage. Grossly unfair contractual obligations resulting
from the use of such expertise or control by the one possessing it, which
result in assumption by the other contracting party of a burden which is
at odds with the common understanding of the ordinary and untrained
member of the public, are considered unconscionable and therefore un-
enforceable.
Id. at 856 (citation omitted).
The perimeter of public policy is an ever increasing one. Although
courts continue to recognize that persons should not be unnecessarily
restricted in their freedom to contract, there is an increasing willingness
to invalidate unconscionable contractual provisions which clearly tend
to injure the public in some way.
Id. at 857.
23 See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabiliy and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (critiquing UCC § 2-3oz and offering the now famous
two-prong analysis); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
EcoN. 293 (1975) (discussing the need for the doctrine to stay within the traditional pro-
cess defenses such as fraud and duress); Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section
2-302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 CoM. L.J. 287 (2000) (summarizing the
controversy); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionabilily
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283
(1995); Eben Colby, What did the Doctrine of Unconscionabiliy Do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company, 34 CONN. L. REv. 625 (2002) (arguing that the unconscionability doctrine had little
overall impact good or bad on the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company or on the consumers
who shop there).
24 Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, ( 1750) z8 Eng. Rep. 8z, IOO.
25 See Brown, supra note 23, at 289 ("As early as 1697, English law already had an equi-
table rule against the enforcement of unconscionable contracts.").
26 Hepburn v. Dunlop & Co., 14 U.S. 179 (1816).
27 Id. at 197.
z8 Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889).
29 Id. at 415; see also Eyre v. Potter, 56 U.S. 42,60 (1953) (behavior sufficiently outrageous
to shock the conscience of the court).
30 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (ioO). This section, perhaps more than any other in Article 2, has
been the subject of controversy. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may re-
fuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 3'
Article 2 does not define unconscionability either in section 2-302 or in the
official comments. The comments attempt to offer some guidance stating,
"[tihe basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial back-
ground and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract. ' 32 Obviously it does not
help to state that a contract is unconscionable if it contains unconscionable
terms. Notwithstanding the lack of a definition, section 2-302 is the law
in 49 states33 and has been widely applied by the courts to consumer sales
contracts. 34
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also includes the doctrine of
unconscionability.35 While restatements do not have the force of law, they
are considered authoritative.36 Moreover, while the Article 2 provision is
limited to contracts involving the sale of goods, 37 the restatement's uncon-
scionability provision is applicable to all types of contracts. 38 The restate-
ment provides as follows:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the re-
mainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit
the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
39
The comments to section 208 are similar to the official comments to
U.C.C. section 2-302 in that they indicate that the doctrine of unconscio-
31 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (i99o); see Brown, supra note 23, at 291 (noting that "[i]t took a de-
cade before the courts began using... 2-302"; "[b]y 1968, fewer than 20 cases were decided
on the basis of § 2-302.").
32 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990).
33 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2o6, 134 (4th
ed. 1995) (noting that the section is "enshrined in the statutory law of forty-nine states.").
California omitted § 2-302 when it adopted the code, but unconscionability is part of California
law by statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (Deering 2004).
34 See Brown, supra note 23, at 291 ("[Unconscionability] is widely applied by courts to
consumer sales contracts and in certain circumstances to sales contracts between merchants
as well.").
35 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
36 CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, RULES OF CoNTcRAcT LAW 128 (1993).
37 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (199o) ("ITlhis Article applies to transactions in goods...").
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
39 Id.
2005- 2oo6]j
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nability allows a court to refuse to enforce part or all of an agreement be-
cause the contract or term is so unfair as to be unconscionable rather than
resort to "adverse construction of language"4 of the contract or clause. 4'
Also similar to the code's section 2-302, no definition of unconscionability
is provided.4
2
There are at least two reasons for the doctrine's checkered history.
First, the idea of invalidating a contract, otherwise enforceable, because it
is deemed by a court to be unfair seems to violate a basic principle of con-
tract law: freedom of contract. 43 That is, a competent person has the free-
dom (within the boundaries set by the established policing, formation, and
disclosure doctrines such as fraud, duress, etc.) to enter into any agreement
they see fit, profitable or unprofitable, fair or unfair.4" Thus, the doctrine of
unconscionability seems to violate the principle of freedom of contract.
45 It
has, however, been argued that, in fact, the doctrine strengthens the princi-
ple of freedom of contract by preventing its abuse.46 Under the framework
40 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990).
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1981) ("[Tlhe rule of this
Section permits the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or clause
rather than to avoid unconscionable results by interpretation.").
42 Id.
43 See Klock, supra note 13, at 333 ("IT]here is a fundamental tension between the doc-
trine and basic contract law, which holds that the level of consideration is irrelevant to contract
formation.") Klock goes on to state:
Unconscionability, for which no redundant defenses exist, is indeed in-
consistent with fundamental contract theory. Basic contract theory re-
quires only competent parties making an agreement with bilateral con-
sideration to make an enforceable contract. The consideration can be
as nominal as a peppercorn for the agreement to be legally enforceable.
Courts do not inquire into the distribution of benefits between the par-
ties. This legal fact is deeply rooted in a strong faith in the efficiency of
free markets. Individuals do not voluntarily enter into agreements that
they expect to make them worse off than before the agreement. If the
agreement was made voluntarily, everyone is presumed to have been
made better off by the agreement. This presumption can be justified by
economic thought which, given a few simple axioms, demonstrates that
markets will channel resources to their most valued use and maximize
society's wealth when all market participants are permitted to freely
make their own decisions. Government intervention cannot improve the
allocation of resources and can even impede it. Unconscionability is an
inherently paternalistic doctrine that is intended to protect individuals
from the consequences of their own decisions and allows them to avoid
detrimental terms.
Id. at 343-44 (citations omitted).
44 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1 i, at §§ 1-3, 1-4.
45 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by con-
sideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningful-
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discussed below, the doctrine applies only when the element of free choice
is compromised, albeit not sufficiently to allow application of any of the
more established doctrines such as fraud or duress.
47
The second difficulty with the doctrine is its lack of definition. Neither
the code, the restatement, nor the courts have developed a consistent spe-
cific definition of an unconscionable contract. 48 Many definitions are tau-
tologies: a contract is unconscionable because it contains unconscionable
terms. 49 This lack of definition has given rise to much of the criticism lev-
eled at the doctrine. The most serious is that the doctrine is inconsistently
applied because it encourages courts to simply substitute their own ex post
judgment regarding fairness for the ex ante judgments of the parties.5 An
analytical framework for unconscionability involving both procedural and
substantive elements suggested by Arthur Allen Leff has, however, been
widely accepted by courts and commentators.5 ' The doctrine's problems
notwithstanding, unconscionability seems to be flourishing.52 It is fre-
quently raised in cases, written into legislation, and written about by legal
scholars.
53
ness of the choice is negated by gross inequality of bargaining power.").
47 See Left, supra note 23, at 487-89.
48 See Frank P Dart, Unconscionabiity and Price Fairness, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1819, 1830
(994) ("The lack of definition or pretense of structure in section 2-302 of the code has led
to unending criticism from legal academics."); Brown, supra note 23, at 291 ("Common law
definitions of unconscionability are likewise so unclear and inconsistent that they provide
little, if any, guidance.... American Law Institute's Restatement... also fail~s] to provide any
guidance whatsoever.").
49 See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. I (I99O) ("The basic test is whether, in the light of the general
commercial background .... the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.").
50 See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV.
1053, 1o62-63 (1977) (noting that if courts modify certain contracts ex post they will cease to
be available ex ante).
51 See Brown, supra note 23, at 296 ("Professor Left's article ... probably comes closest to
defining unconscionability."). While most courts accept Left's analysis, a number of commen-
tators have offered alternatives. See, e.g., Klock, supra note 13, at 376 (incorporating the idea of
discrimination into the definition of unconscionability); Darr, supra note 48, at 1840 (suggest-
ing that unconscionability analysis should address three factors: "the perceived fairness of the
contract price compared to a reference price, the perceived fairness of the transaction process,
and the ability of the market to enforce the perceived fair price.").
52 See Klock, supra note 13, at 333 ("There are three pieces of evidence that indicate that
the doctrine continues to survive, if not flourish."); Dart, supra note 48, at 1832 ("Despite the
large amount of ink spilled in criticism of the use of unconscionability, the courts nonetheless
resort to the doctrine to reject or modify contractual arrangements. The courts have found
some utility in the concept. They appear to be attempting to enforce some norms of com-
munity justice in these cases.").
53 See Klock, supra note 13, at 333-34 (citing examples of each); Brown, supra note 23, at
291 (noting that U.C.C. § 2-302 is "widely applied by courts....").
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B. Analytical Framework for Unconscionability
Leff's generally accepted analytical framework of unconscionability sug-
gests that it is different from the defenses of fraud, duress, mistake, im-
possibility, or illegality because these traditional defenses focus on either
the "process of contracting" or the "resulting contract," but not both.M
Unconscionability, according to Leff, looks at both the process and the
result~5 Thus, there are two prongs to the unconscionability analysis: the
process prong, or procedural unconscionability, and the results prong, or
substantive unconscionability.56 While some courts are willing to find a
contract unconscionable based on substantive unconscionability alone s7
(this has most commonly occurred in excessive price cases),58 analysis of
court decisions suggests that a majority of courts generally accept Leff's
framework and require both procedural and substantive unconscionabil-
ity.59 However, prior case law supports the application of a sliding scale, so
that the existence of an extreme in one component would allow a contract
to be found unconscionable even though the other component was present
to a much lesser degree.60
i. Procedural Unconscionabiliy. -A contract is procedurally unconscionable
if there is some defect in the contracting process such that one party has
not entered into the agreement knowingly and freely.6' Important factors
54 See Leff, supra note 23, at 487.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Brown, supra note 23, at 294-95.
58 See, e.g., Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. Mac Iver, 201 A.2d 886,887-89 (N.H. 1964)
(contract unconscionable where homeowner agreed to pay excessive price and financing
costs); Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78, 79-81 (Union County Ct. 1970) (contract unconscio-
nable due to price more than 2 1/2 times reasonable retail value, no evidence of procedural
unconscionability); Darr, supra note 48, at 182o-22 (reviewing price based unconscionability
cases).
59 See Darr, supra note 48, at 1820 ("Generally, courts require ... both substantive and
procedural unconscionability."); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 151 (suggesting that both
procedural and substantive unconscionability are required).
60 See Brown, supra note 23, at 305 n.175 (citing Tacoma Boatbuilding Inc. v. Delta
Fishing Co., No. 165-72C3, 198o U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17830, at *2o n.zo (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 198o)
("[Tihe substantive/procedural analysis is more of a sliding scale than a true dichotomy.")
Brown notes that this case is cited in WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 33. WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 33, at 151 ("[A] contract that is ninety-eight parts substantively unconscionable
may require only two parts of procedural unconscionability to render it unenforceable and
vice versa.").
61 See Brown, supra note 23, at 291, 297 (noting that procedural unconscionability in-
volves surprise which "usually results where there are hidden contract terms, terms in un-
readable fine print, or unusually complex technical terms that the ordinary consumer cannot
understand.").
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in this analysis are the relative bargaining power of the parties, whether the
weaker party was free to negotiate for alteration of the terms offered (usu-
ally in a standardized preprinted form) by the stronger party, and whether
the weaker party had the realistic opportunity to seek the goods or services
elsewhere. 62 The concept of an adhesion contract is similar to procedural
unconscionability. 63 Most courts find that an adhesion contract is procedur-
ally unconscionable. 64
A procedurally unconscionable contract results in the surprise, oppres-
sion, or both of the weaker party.65 That is, the weaker party is surprised
to learn of the terms of the agreement because they were hidden in fine
print or obtuse language,66 or because the only way for the weaker party
to acquire the goods or services was to agree to the terms dictated by the
stronger party.67 Hospital admission contracts are drafted in a way that pre-
vents the patient from knowing how much money they are agreeing to
6z See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 Ezd 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party."). The court went on to discuss the importance of the relative
bargaining power of the parties: "[ilnquiry into the relative bargaining power of the two par-
ties is not an inquiry wholly divorced from the general question of unconscionabiliry, since a
one-sided bargain is itself evidence of the inequality of the bargaining parties." Id. at 450 n.7;
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963) (concerning an exculpatory
clause in a hospital admission contract, the court noted that "the hospital certainly exercises
a decisive advantage in bargaining. The would-be patient is in no position to reject the prof-
fered agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agreement to find another hospi-
tal."). Tunkl is discussed infra at notes 168-7o and accompanying text.
63 See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., i33 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). The case
involved an agreement to arbitrate in a hospital admission contract. Regarding the definition
of adhesion contract the court stated:
The term "adhesion contract" refers to standardized contract forms of-
fered to consumers of goods and services on essentially a 'take it or leave
it' basis without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain
and under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired
product or services except by acquiescing in the form contract .... The
distinctive feature of a contract of adhesion is that the weaker party has
no realistic choice as to its terms.
Id. at 783 (citations omitted). Wheeler is discussed in more detail infra at notes 171-9o and ac-
companying text.
64 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811
(2003) ("A contract is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion.").
65 See, e.g., Phoenix Baptist Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Aiken, 877 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994) (concerning hospital admission contract signed by husband for medical ser-
vices provided to his wife and purporting to make husband personally liable for such services,
the court noted that "the trier of fact could conclude either that [the husband] did not under-
stand the implications of the agreement, or that he felt he had no choice but to immediately
sign the preprinted form.").
66 Id.
67 Id.
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pay the hospital.' In addition, the admission contract does not make clear
that uninsured patients are, by agreeing to pay the hospital's "full charges,"
agreeing to pay many times the amount insured patients pay for the same
medical services.69 Moreover, these agreements are entered into in circum-
stances where the patient has little opportunity to understand the terms of-
fered 7o and no choice but to agree to whatever terms the hospital dictates.7'
The lack of a commercial setting, a bargaining table, or time to read and
negotiate all contribute substantially to the procedural unconscionability
of hospital admission contracts. 72 The overriding factor, however, in find-
ing hospital admission contracts procedurally unconscionable is that urgent
medical services are necessities, and time is virtually always important.73
Thus, even if a patient understands the terms in the hospital admission
contract and decides he does not want to agree to them, he is in no position
to shop for an alternative supplier of urgently needed medical services. 74
The patient must agree to the terms the hospital offers, because the patient
68 See infra notes 104-67 and accompanying text.
69 As noted above, the fact that hospital admission agreements do not contain a specific
price for the medical services to be provided is not the fault of the hospital. In contrast, the
fact that hospitals refer to "regular rates" or "full charges" is both deceptive and the hospi-
tal's fault. The phrases "regular rates," "full charges" or "list prices" imply that these are the
amounts that all or at least most patients pay. In fact, less then five percent of patients pay this
amount. See supra notes 1o-17 and accompanying text. Thus, the agreement to pay "regular
rates" results in unfair surprise and oppression to uninsured patients.
70 See St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.zd 935 (N.Y Civ. Ct. 1978).
It is reasonable in this situation for defendant to have seen himself as
powerless to do anything other than sign the form. A hospital emergency
room is certainly not a place in which any but the strongest can be ex-
pected to exercise calm and dispassionate judgment.... Plaintiff hospi-
tal is surely no stranger to the trauma and anxiety experienced by those
confronted with emergency medical crises. Armed with this knowledge
it should have prepared the form it uses to impose liability so that the
person being asked to sign it can readily grasp its meaning, even through
quick reading. Moreover, plaintiff should not be permitted to enforce
a contractual obligation entered into under such tension-laden circum-
stances, as those defendants described.
Id. at 937. McAdoo is discussed infra at notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
71 Id.
72 See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963). The would-be
patient is in no position to reject the proffered agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or
in lieu of agreement to find another hospital. The admission room of a hospital contains no
bargaining table where, as in a private business transaction, the parties can debate the terms
of their contract.
73 A valid distinction may be drawn between necessary medical services, whether ren-
dered on an emergency basis or on a planned basis, and elective medical services such as
elective cosmetic surgery. See infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
74 See infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
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requires the services. 75 In the case of planned necessary medical services,
the patient feels he must go to the hospital selected by his physician.7
6
This, of course, is not the fault of the hospital, nor does it alone make hospi-
tal admission contracts unconscionable and thus unenforceable. 77 The fact
that patients are forced by circumstances to agree to whatever terms the
hospital offers does make hospital admission contracts procedurally uncon-
scionable. 78 However, the hospital admission contract will be unenforce-
able only if, in addition to being procedurally unconscionable, it is also
substantively unconscionable or grossly unfair.
79
2. Substantive Unconscionability.-Substantive unconscionability is con-
cerned with the terms of the agreement between the parties and not with
the process from which they resulted. 8° Specifically, a contract is substan-
tively unconscionable if it is grossly unfair or contains terms that are so
one-sided or unfair as to shock the conscience of the court. 8' A contract or
a provision of a contract may be found substantively unconscionable if it
provides for the allocation of risks between the parties in an unreasonable
or unexpected manner.82 Oppression or overreaching by the stronger party
are hallmarks of substantive unconscionability.83 One court noted that a
contract is substantively unconscionable if it results in the assumption by
the weaker party "of a burden which is at odds with the common under-
75 See infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
76 SeeWheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775,789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ("A patient
like Mr. Wheeler realistically has no choice but to seek admission to the hospital to which
he has been directed by his physician and to sign the printed forms necessary to gain admis-
sion."). Wheeler is discussed infra at notes 17 i-9o and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 8o-Io3 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding the fact that patients
are in no position to properly negotiate or even focus on the terms of the admission agree-
ment when they seek necessary medical services, there is nothing unreasonable in requiring
patients to pay the reasonable value of the medical services they receive. Cf. supra note I I
and accompanying text (recovery in quasi contract for medical services rendered to a patient
incapable of entry into a contract).
78 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 8o-io 3 and accompanying text.
8o See Leff, supra note 23, at 509 (substantive unconscionability refers to the "gross over-
all imbalance of an entire contract.").
8i See Brown, supra note 23, at 293 (discussing substantive unconscionability in terms
such as unfair, harsh, one-sided, oppressive, or the unjustified reallocation of the risks of the
bargain in an unreasonable ot unexpected manner).
8z Id.; see, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.zd 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (assump-
tion of burden by weaker party that is at odds with consumer understanding is unconscio-
nable).
83 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. i (199o) ("The principle is one of the prevention of op-
pression and unfair surprise....1").
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standing of the ordinary and untrained member of the public," or if the
terms are contrary to common fairness. 84
An excessive price may support a finding of substantive unconsciona-
bility.85 Excessive prices also provide an indication of defects in the bar-
gaining process.86 One commentator has concluded that "price unconscio-
nability is part of the basic foundation of contract law."87 Courts, however,
have been inconsistent in setting a standard for when a price becomes un-
conscionably excessive. 88 Some courts have found that an excessive mark
up results in substantive unconscionability.89 Other courts have found a
price to be substantively unconscionable if the contract price is higher than
those charged by other merchants for the same or similar goods. 90 Other
courts focus on whether the price returns too great a profit to the seller.9'
In addition, a price might be considered exorbitant in part because of the
economic status of the purchaser.92
Commentators also have been inconsistent in setting a standard for an
unconscionable price.93 Some suggest that a substantively unconscionable
price results when the seller engages in price discrimination. 94 An argument
may be made that charging a different price based solely on the identity
84 See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc., 236 A.2d at 856..
85 See Brown, supra note 23, at 299 (noting that excessive price cases are a common type
of substantive unconscionability case).
86 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981) ("[G]ross disparity in
the values exchanged may be an important factor in a determination that a contract is uncon-
scionable....").
87 See Darr, supra note 48, at 1822 ("[Plrice unconscionability is part of the basic founda-
tion of contract law.") (citations omitted).
88 See Brown, supra note 23, at 299 (noting that the price cases "lack a consistent standard
for determining whether or not a price is excessive").
89 See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'don
othergrounds, 281 N.Y.S.zd 964 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (Seller's cost was $348 and the install-
ment sale price was $1,145.8o); Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. Mac Iver, 2o A.2d 886 (N.H.
1964) (goods priced at $959 sold for $2,568).
90 See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (freezer with
retail value of $300 sold for $1,44o); Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (Union County Ct. 1970)
(freezer with retail value of $4oo sold for $1,230).
91 See Brown, supra note 23, at 301 ("Courts might consider a price excessive because it
returns too great a profit to the seller or because it represents a substantially higher price than
similarly situated merchants charge for like items.").
92 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445, 448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(the district court described one of the appellants, Ora Lee Williams, as being a person of
limited education separated from her husband and maintaining herself and her seven children
by means of public assistance.).
93 Cf. Darr, supra note 48, at 1841 (three requirements for excessive price to be uncon-
scionable: high price based on a standard such as cost, fair market value, or historic price; pro-
cess problems; and market failure in sense of no private enforcement of price norms); Klock,
supra note 13, at 373 (excessive price is unconscionable only in context of market failure).
94 See Klock, supra note 13, at 367.
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of the buyer with no cost justification is always unconscionable. 95 Others
suggest that an unconscionably excessive price can only be determined by
comparing the contract price to some reference price. 96 One commentator
suggests that it is necessary to find a sufficient disparity (possibly two to
one) between the price charged by the seller and the average of all retail
prices charged for like goods in the community in which the consumer
resides.97 Commentators also imply that an excessive price is "two or three
times greater than at least one other available price-in the low income
neighborhood or elsewhere." 98 Yet another commentator suggests a three-
prong test consisting of a price significantly in excess of a reference price
(substantive prong), contracting process problems resulting in overreach-
ing (procedural prong), and the inability of the market to enforce a fair
price (a third requirement, market failure). 99
Whether a specific price is unconscionable also depends on the amount
of procedural unconscionability present. °00 With significant procedural un-
conscionability, courts are likely to require less excessiveness to find a high
price unconscionable. The cases and commentary suggest that an uncon-
scionable price is one which is significantly greater than either the price
at which the same seller sells to other customers (unless there is a cost
justification for the different prices), the price charged by other sellers in
the area for the same good or service, or the cost of the good to the seller.102
Regardless of which of the above standards is used, the "full charges" re-
flected on hospital charge masters are unconscionable.'
0 3
III. HOSPITAL BILLING PRACTICES
Problems with pricing are inherent in contracting for medical services."l 4
With the exception of purely elective medical procedures, medical services
95 Id
96 See Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L.
REV. 359, 372-74 (1969).
97 Id.
98 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 144.
99 See Darr, supra note 48 (supra at note 93).
10o See supra notes 59-6o and accompanying text.
iol See supra notes 59-6o and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 86-Ilo and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 242-97 and accompanying text.
1o4 See Darr, supra note 48, at 1834 (discussing the distinction between auction and price
tag markets and market failure regarding pricing.). The conditions that lead to the inability of
the market to enforce a fair price according to Darr include,
limited likelihood of a future sale, difficult informational problems in
determining either the need for the product or its quality relative to
price, high relational effects between the parties that prevent the ero-
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are necessary, and thus there is much less change in the demand for medi-
cal services as a result of rising prices than for other types of goods or ser-
vices. 105 Moreover, at the time of contracting, patients usually do not know
with any degree of certainty what medical services or goods they are buy-
ing or the specific price they are agreeing to pay for such goods or servic-
es.' °6 Patients are simply following their physician's advice when seeking
medical care from a hospital.10 7 In many cases, a patient literally entrusts
his life to his doctor's judgment.1°8 Specifically, neither the hospital nor the
patient knows at the time the contract is entered into the extent and thus
the price of the medical services the patient will require. 109 As a result, the
sion of good will, or situations in which the future credibility of the seller
is not relevant to the buyer.
Id. at 1841. All of these conditions exist with regard to the uninsured patient purchase of med-
ical services. See infra notes io6-io8 and accompanying text. Indeed, with respect to price, the
market for medical services is not an auction or a price tag market; it is a blind market because
neither party knows the price at the time of contracting. Thus, courts must intervene under
the doctrine of unconscionability to set a fair price.
105 The fact that medical services are necessities prevents markets from operating nor-
mally and necessitates the courts' involvement to set a fair price. See Darr, supra note 48, at
1832 ("Except in the rare case of necessities, it is difficult to imagine that a party could not
walk away from a transaction or that a party could be surprised by a price term .... ).
io6 Hospital admission agreements provide that the patient agrees to pay for all medical
services provided by the hospital at its "regular rates." There is typically no mention made
of a specific dollar amount, thus, the patient has no idea how much he is agreeing to pay the
hospital. This, however, is not the hospital's fault or the result of any deception on the part of
the hospital. The reason for the lack of a specific amount is endemic in the nature of medical
service. That is, at the time of admission neither the hospital nor the patient knows the extent
of medical services that will be required.
107 See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
("Unless advised by his doctor to the contrary, the patient normally feels he has no choice but
to seek admission to the designated hospital and to accede to all of the terms and conditions
for admission.... [N]or did Mr. Wheeler have a choice among hospitals.... A patient like Mr.
Wheeler realistically has no choice but to seek admission to the hospital to which he has been
directed by his physician....").
to8 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 E2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) in which the court
stated:
The patient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which
traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with arms-
length transactions. His dependence upon the physician for informa-
tion affecting his well-being, in terms of contemplated treatment, is well
nigh abject.... [L]ong before the instant litigation arose, courts had rec-
ognized that the physician had the responsibility of satisfying the vital
informational needs of the patient. More recently, we ourselves have
found "in the fiducial qualities of [the physician-patient] relationship
the physician's duty to reveal to the patient that which in his best inter-
ests it is important that he should know."
Id. (citations omitted).
io9 See Lagnado, supra note 12, at Ai ("For years, details on hospital charges were kept
secret. Hospitals deemed their prices proprietary, to be kept off limits from institutional rivals,
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patient often has no idea at the time of contracting how much he is agree-
ing to pay." 0 The actual amount is not known until long after the creation
of the contract."' Typically patients agree to an open-ended obligation by
agreeing to pay the hospital's "full charges" (or some similar language) for
all services and goods provided.-2 Finally, the hospital pricing policy is the
product of a maze of confusing and contradictory regulations resulting from
the third-party reimbursement system. ' 3
insurers and even consumers. Patients often had no idea what costs they were racking up
until they got their bill."); see, e.g., Phoenix Baptist Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Aiken, 877 P.2d
1345, 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (agreement signed by patient provided "[patient] is hereby
individually obligated to pay the account of the hospital in accordance with the regular rates
and terms of the hospital...."); Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 779 n.2 (agreement signed by patients
provided "he hereby individually obligates himself to pay the account of the hospital in ac-
cordance with the regular rates and terms of the hospital.").
I io See supra note 1o9.
I iI See supra note ! 09.
112 See supra note io9.
113 See, e.g., Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 E3d 142, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2004),
in which the court summarizes some of the more recent developments in the federal Medicare
program as follows:
The federal Medicare program, administered by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, is the largest public program financing
health care services for the aged and disabled. Hospitals that provide
services to Medicare patients are reimbursed for their expenses under
Title XVII of the Social Security Act (the "Medicare Act"), 42 U.S.C. §
1395 etseq. Part A of the Medicare Act authorizes payment to participat-
ing hospitals ("providers") for their direct and indirect costs of providing
inpatient care to beneficiaries. 42 C.F.R. § 413.9(a), (b). Medicare also
reimburses teaching hospitals for the costs of graduate medical educa-
tion, including physician time for instructing and supervising interns
and residents. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h).
Medicare services are furnished by "providers of services" that have
entered into provider agreements with the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(u),
1395cc. To receive payment from the Secretary, providers are required
to comply with the provider agreement, as well as all Medicare statutes
and regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(b)(2).
From its inception, Medicare reimbursed hospitals for all reason-
able incurred costs related to providing medical care to patients. The
Medicare Act defines "reasonable cost" as "the cost actually incurred,"
less any costs "unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed health
services." 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(i)(A). Under the historical system of rea-
sonable cost reimbursement, no reimbursement distinction turned on
whether costs were reported as operating costs (the day-to-day expenses
incurred in running a business) or graduate medical education costs.
Medicare paid its full pro rata share of all allowable graduate medical
education costs and operating costs actually incurred, consistent with
the statutory requirement preventing shifting the costs of services in-
curred on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries to other patients or third
2oo5-2oo6]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Hospitals devote significant time and effort to establishing and up-
dating their charge master, which is a detailed list of full charges for each
good and service provided. 114 However, hospitals establish these charges
with the clear expectation that they will receive only a portion of these
so-called "full charges." 15 For example, in one case expert testimony was
given that the hospital's "full" or "published" charges for 1995 and 1996
were about 300% of the hospital's costs." 6 The same testimony states that
hospitals actually recover their full charges only one to three percent of the
time.' ,7 More recently, the national average full-charge rate was about 345%
of costs."' Private payors such as insurance companies and HMOs pay a
negotiated rate, which is contractually discounted." 9 The reimbursement
on average is about 40% of a hospital's "full" or "published" charge.'20 It
party payers. 42 U.S.C. § 13 95x(v)(1)(A).
In 1982, Congress modified the Medicare program to require hospi-
tals to render services more economically. In the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA'), Pub. L. No. 97-248, Congress
amended the Medicare Act by imposing a ceiling on the rate-of-increase
of inpatient operating costs recoverable by a hospital. Under TEFRA,
costs were still reimbursed on a reasonable cost basis, but subject to rate-
of-increase limits. The rate-of-increase limit was computed according to
a 'target amount,' which, in turn, was calculated according to a hospital's
allowable net Medicare operating costs in the hospital's base year. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(b); 42 C.ER. § 413.40(c) (zooz).
In 1983, Congress amended the Medicare Act again, establishing a
prospective payment system for reimbursing inpatient operating costs
of acute care hospitals. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d). Hospitals now are
reimbursed on the basis of prospectively determined national and re-
gional rates for each discharge, rather than on the basis of retrospectively
determined reasonable costs incurred. Under this system, payment is
made at a predetermined rate for each hospital discharge, according to
the patient's diagnosis.
Id. (citations omitted). See Lagnado, supra note 12 (quoting William McGowan, chief financial
officer of the University of California, Davis, Health System with 30 years of experience in
hospital finances. With regard to pricing and billing, Mr. McGowan says, "[tihere is no method
to the madness." The current reimbursement system for hospitals is in need of drastic reform.
Mr. McGowan says, "[w]e have.., allowed the industry to develop a system we all agree is
broken.").
114 See supra notes 12-2o and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 12-2o and accompanying text.
116 Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 509
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appeal denied, 847 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 2004).
117 Id. at 5o8.
118 See Love or Corruption, supra note 12, at 3 (discussed supra at note 16).
119 See supra notes 12-2o and accompanying text.
1 2o See Temple, 832 A.2d at 509 ("In addition, Dr. Dobson testified that private payors
typically paid 121% of the cost of hospital services in 1994, 119% in 1995, and 112% in 1996.
Government payors generally pay less.").
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is estimated that HMOs pay about 55% to 6o% of list price,121 while gov-
ernment payors, such as Medicare and Medicaid, "generally pay less ..22
Each contract insurer and health maintenance organization negotiates its
own reimbursement rate, and information regarding reimbursement rates
is kept confidential. 23 Technically, every patient is billed the "full charges,"
because this allows the hospital to establish that these inflated prices are
really its "usual charges." This is important because Medicare regulations
prohibit providers from charging Medicare "substantially in excess" of the
hospital's "usual charges." 114
However, while all patients and payors are billed the "full charges,"
the only ones actually expected to pay these charges are those patients
without medical insurance.2 s Hospitals feel financial pressure to set their
"full charges," or charges reflected on their charge master, as high as pos-
sible, because the higher the "full charge" the greater the reimbursement
amount the hospital receives since reimbursement rates are often set as a
percentage of the hospital's "full charge."12 6 Another factor that causes the
"full charges" to be so high is the annual budgeting process, which takes
into account bad debt, contracted discounts, and "cost shifting.",27 Given
these factors, the "full charge" amount must be set at a high level to make
the hospital's budget balance. 12 In addition, federal "stop loss and outlier"
reimbursement provisions also encourage hospitals to set high charges and
raise them often. 29
121 Id. (thus, list prices are set at 300% of cost while reimbursement is 112% of cost-
e.g., if cost is $5.00, list price is 15 and reimbursement by private payors is 1i[z% of cost or
$5.60 or 5.6o/15.00 - 37% of list price).
122 Id.
323 See Lagnado, supra note 12, at i ("[Hligh list prices have been a 'negotiating tool' for
hospitals in dealing with HMO's that demand big discounts... "); Jones, supra note 12, at 29
("Unfortunately, the exact predetermined fixed rates paid by managed care plans are carefully
guarded secrets. Our research disclosed that every private managed care contract contains a
confidentiality provision.").
124 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320 a-7(b)(6) (2003); see generally Medicare Provider Reimbursement
Manual (PRM) § 2203.
125 See Lagnado, supra note 32 (noting that only uninsured patients are expected to pay
full charges).
126 See Love or Corruption, supra note 12, at 4-5 (listing annual budgeting, consequential
reductions from insurance contracts, consequential reduction of governmental "stop loss" re-
imbursement, and consequential loss of Medicare outliers as reasons charges are so high and
hospitals are reluctant to lower them). Interestingly, it is not a violation of federal regulations
for hospitals to set high, full-charge rates that do not relate closely to costs. Id. at 8-11.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 5-8 (explaining why the rules for outlier reimbursement encouraged hospitals
to raise their list prices and noting that while the rules are in flux, it is not clear that the prob-
lem has been solved).
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While all uninsured patients are expected to pay the hospital's "full
charges," it appears that in fact less than five percent actually pay the full
charge. 130 Even though most uninsured patients do not actually pay the full
charge, the burden created by this debt and the often harsh collection tac-
tics used on behalf of many hospitals by their debt collectors can devastate
uninsured patients.'3' Moreover, hospitals have generally refused to dis-
count their "full charges," because this could dramatically lower the pay-
ments they receive under existing contracts with private insurers, HMOs,
and the government.
32
There are a number of federal rules and statutes that discourage hos-
pitals from discounting charges and/or waiving co-insurance payments.'
33
Essentially, by reducing its full charges or by waiving co-payments, a hospi-
tal may be jeopardizing its Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, 34 and
perhaps its reimbursement from HMOs and contract insurers as well.'
35
130 See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501,
506 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appeal denied, 847 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 2004) ("[N]inety-four percent of
the time, the Hospital received less than eighty percent of the Hospital's published rates.").
131 See, e.g., Lagnado, supra notes 2, 6 and 12; Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still
Paying, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at B i(discussing Quinton White, 77 years old, and his strug-
gle to pay for his late wife's ballooning hospital bill for the past 20 years); Lucette Lagnado,
Hospitals Try Extreme Measures to Collect Their Overdue Debts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at AI
(discussing the harsh tactics used by hospitals including body attachment or civil arrest war-
rants to enforce the excessively high bills of the uninsured); Lucette Lagnado, Taming Hospital
Billing: Lawmakers Push Legislation to Curb Aggressive Collection Against Uninsured Patients, WALL
ST. J., June 10, 2003, at Bi (discussing harsh collection tactics used on behalf of hospitals);
Lucette Lagnado, Dunnedfor Old Bills, Poor FindSome Hospitals Never Forget, WALL ST. J., June
8, zoo, at As (discussing harsh collection tactics of hospitals and the devastating impact on
uninsured patients).
132 See supra notes 127-3
o 
and accompanying text.
133 See Love or Corruption, supra note 12, at 12 ("A panoply of federal rules and stat-
utes also have discouraged hospitals from discounting and waiving co-insurance payments.").
There has been some discussion of these issues, but whether progress has been made is hard
to tell. See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Hospitals Will Give Price Breaks to Uninsured, ifMedicare Agrees:
They Concede Many Charges Aren't Fair to the Needy But Blame Federal Rules, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17,
2003, at As (discussing the American Hospital Association's claim that Medicare regulations
prevent hospitals from reducing prices for the uninsured); Lucette Lagnado, HHS Chief Scolds
Hospitals for their Treatment of Uninsured, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2004, at Ai (discussing HHS's
claim that hospitals had mischaracterized government policy and were simply not correct in
arguing that complex federal rules left them no choice but to bill the uninsured full price);
Lucette Lagnado, New York State Hospitals Agree to Cut Prices for Uninsured, WALL ST. J., Feb.
2, 2004, at Bi ("[H]ospitals in New York State have agreed to a voluntary program to cut
prices and provide charity care for their poorest patients."); Rhonda L. Rundle, Activist for
Uninsured Needles Hospitals-And Draws Blood, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003, at As (discussing
Tenet Healthcare Corp.'s announcement of a "Compact with Uninsured Patients" program in
which they pledged to "start giving discounts to uninsured people similar to the discounts it
offers managed-care companies").
134 See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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This is something no hospital can afford to do. As noted previously, all of
these payors negotiate contractual discounts that are often expressed as a
percentage of the hospital's "usual charges."3 6 The problem for the hos-
pital is that if it reduces its "full charge" for uninsured patients, then it is
vulnerable to the argument that its real "usual charge" is not that contained
on the hospital's charge master, but is in fact the reduced rate at which it
bills the uninsured1 37 There is a narrow exception in the federal regula-
tions that allows a hospital to waive or reduce its usual or full charges for the
indigent, but this is acceptable only after the hospital determines in good
faith that the individual is in "financial need" or it "fails to collect.., after
making good faith collection efforts."'3 The Provider Reimbursement
Manual (PRM) does allow for write-offs (not waivers) based on financial
or medical indigency, but provides that indigency "[m]ust be determined
by the provider," '39 not based merely on a signed patient declaration of in-
ability to pay.'4° Providers must consider cash and assets (other than those
required for daily living) which are "convertible to cash," and must also
verify the absence of any other legally responsible payment source. '4, The
file "should contain documentation of the method by which indigence was
determined in addition to all backup information" used to "substantiate
the [indigency] determination."142 The Office of the Inspector General
("OIG"), which has the power to terminate Medicare participation, also re-
quires vigorous collection efforts and has denied bad debt reimbursements
for write-offs based on patient-provided financial information.43
Moreover, Medicare provides hospitals a dollar-for-dollar credit for
Medicare bad debt (i.e., unpaid deductibles or co-insurance) but only if
the provider undertook reasonable collective efforts.- This requires that
collection efforts for Medicare and non-Medicare patients be similar.' 45 For
136 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
138 See Social Security Act § 1128 A(i)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320 (2005).
139 See Provider Reimbursement Manual, supra note 124, at § 312.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See Shalala v. St. Paul-Ramsey Med. Ctr., 50 E3d 522 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing deni-
als of bad debt reimbursement due to reliance on patient provided financial information).
144 See 42 C.F.R. § 413.8o(e)(2) (requiring provider to undertake reasonable collection
efforts).
145 See Provider Reimbursement Manual, supra note 124, at § 310 (noting that where
a provider expends less effort to collect from some patients than from others, its policy is
deemed contrary to Medicare Policy because it is inconsistent). In a February 2oo4 letter, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services noted that hospitals may waive self-payments
for indigent or medically indigent patients uniformly, but may not claim bad debt for such
voluntarily reduced collections from indigent Medicare patients. Otherwise, collections poli-
cies against all non-indigent patients should be uniform. See Love or Corruption, supra note 12,
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example, in Mt. Sinai Hospital Medical Center v. Shalala,46 the government
refused to reimburse the hospital for bad debt, because the collection ef-
forts used for Medicare and non-Medicare accounts were different. 47 The
hospital's attempts to collect both Medicare and non-Medicare accounts
were identical during the first I2o days the debts were outstanding, and
during this time the collection effort was handled directly by the hospi-
tal. ' 48 After 120 days, non-Medicare debts over $50 were turned over to var-
ious collection agencies for further efforts at settling the accounts. 49 The
Medicare debt, however, was submitted to Medicare for reimbursement as
bad debt. so The hospital argued that given the low rate of return expected
on its Medicare accounts, referral of these accounts to a collection agency
would not be cost effective.' 5' In addition, the hospital argued that referral
of Medicare accounts to collection agencies might prevent needy patients
from seeking treatment.'5 2 The court rejected these arguments, however,
and the hospital was denied reimbursement of its Medicare bad debts for
the years involved. 53 Similarly, in February 2004, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) noted that hospitals may uniformly waive self
payments for indigent or medically indigent patients, including Medicare
patients, but the hospital may not claim bad debt reimbursement for such
voluntarily reduced collections from indigent Medicare patients.154
As a result of these rules and regulations, hospitals are engaged in an
odd type of price discrimination.'55 That is, the amount the hospital re-
quires a patient to pay changes depending on who, if anyone, provides the
patient's insurance.'56 This is odd because hospitals are not segmenting
the market by demand and charging more to high demand/high net worth
patients. 57 Rather, the price discrimination practiced by hospitals is a con-
sequence of the third party reimbursement system and the ill-conceived
and inconsistently applied rules that govern the reimbursement system.18
Notwithstanding the odd nature of hospitals' price discrimination, it is nev-
at 15.
146 Mt. Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 196 E3d 703 (7th Cir. 1999).
147 Id. at 705.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 705-06.
151 Id. at 709 (the hospital was located on the west side of Chicago and served an
impoverished area; 82 percent of the hospital's revenue came from Medicare).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 711.
154 See supra note 145-5 1.
155 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
I56 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
157 See Klock, supra note 13, at 327-33 (discussing price discrimination).
158 See supra notes 104-57 and accompanying text.
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ertheless grossly unfair to uninsured patients.'59 The result is that charges
to the uninsured are outrageously high, hospitals are reluctant to write-off
or forgive the debt of uninsured patients who do not pay in full, and hospi-
tals feel forced to use tough and often harsh collection tactics to qualify for
bad debt reimbursement under federal regulations.'16
The basic unfairness is patent; there is no good reason why one patient
should be expected to pay two or more times the amount paid by other
patients for the same goods and services provided by the same hospital.' 6'
Additionally, the uninsured should not be forced to compensate hospitals
for losses incurred as a result of federal requirements and contracts with
insurers. 162 The uninsured should also not be burdened with the obligation
of paying exorbitant charges resulting from the hospital's desire to maxi-
mize reimbursement from third-party payors.' 63 The contention that the
principle of freedom of contract gives a hospital the right to unilaterally set
a price for its services that bears no relation to either the cost of the goods
or services or to the amount customarily paid for such goods or services
is untenable.' 64 The fact that an uninsured patient has signed a hospital
admission form that says he agrees to pay the hospital's "full charges" does
not change the unfairness of hospital pricing.' 65 Given the circumstances of
hospital admissions, the nature of medical services, and the inflated level
of "full charges," the argument that the patient's express agreement to pay
the hospital's "full charges" should be enforced is grossly unfair and places
form over substance.' 66 It is just this sort of grossly unfair result that the
159 See supra notes 104-57 and accompanying text; Temple Univ. Hosp. v. Healthcare
Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. zoo3), appeal denied, 847 A.2d 1288
(Pa. 2004) (hospital's list prices were "designed to offset the shortfall caused by its federal
mandate to treat indigent patients.").
I6o See supra notes 104-57 and accompanying text.
161 This of course is true of all price discrimination and has caused one commentator
to state "if price discrimination is not unconscionable, then what is?" Klock, supra note 13,
at 353.
16z See supra note 16 1; Lagnado, supra note 12. With regard to the excessive list prices or
full charges the author notes that, "[bluffeted by managed care, squeezed by federal and state
governments and overrun with patients who either couldn't pay or lacked coverage, hospitals
felt they had no choice but to develop aggressive survival strategies." Id.
163 See infra note 133.
164 See St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1978) ("This is exactly the type of situation in which a flexible application of the doctrine
of inviolability of contract is warranted to permit appropriate judicial compassion and
understanding."); Temple, 832 A.2d at 5 10 ("The Hospital's contention that it can unilaterally
set a price for its services that bears no relationship to the amount typically paid for those
services is untenable.").
165 See infra notes Io4-64 and accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 1o4-65 and accompanying text.
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doctrine of unconscionability prevents and, in so doing, strengthens the
principle of freedom of contract.'67
IV. CASE LAW
A. Case Law: Procedural Unconscionability
Many courts have found that hospital admission contracts are procedur-
ally unconscionable. In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, the
defendant hospital presented all incoming patients with a document titled
"Conditions of Admission," which included an exculpatory clause pursu-
ant to which the patient released the hospital from liability for negligent
or wrongful acts. 68 In refusing to enforce the agreement, the court noted
that "[t]he would-be patient is in no position to reject the proffered agree-
ment, to bargain with the hospital, or, in lieu of agreement, to find another
hospital."' 69 The court in Tunkl therefore concluded that the patient had no
realistic choice but to assent to the standardized agreement under which he
waived his right to recover for negligently inflicted injuries.
17
In Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, Wheeler was admitted to the hospital
for an angiogram and catheterization studies in connection with a coro-
nary insufficiency.' 7' "The following morning, shortly after the tests were
performed, Wheeler suffered a brain stem infarction rendering him a to-
tal quadriplegic with inability to speak or otherwise communicate except
with his eyes." ,72 At issue was an arbitration provision included in an agree-
ment titled "Conditions of Admission" that Wheeler signed when he was
admitted to the hospital.173 The agreement included a paragraph titled
"Arbitration Option," which provided:
If patient, or undersigned, does not agree to the 'Arbitration Option,' then
he will initial here . The undersigned certifies that he has read the
foregoing, receiving a copy thereof, and is the patient, or is duly authorized
by the patient as patient's general agent to execute the above and accept
its terms." 74
The agreement provided that the patient could opt out of arbitration
either by placing his initials in the space provided or, in the alternative,
167 See supra notes io4-66 and accompanying text..
168 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 44z (Cal. 1963).
169 Id. at 447.
170 Id.
171 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., i33 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 779.
174 Id. at 780.
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by notifying the hospital in writing within thirty days of his discharge.'75
Wheeler's spouse stated that "her husband signed the admission form
without reading it; no one at the hospital called their attention to the
'ARBITRATION OPTION,' either before or after [her] husband signed the docu-
ment, and neither [she nor her husband] was aware of its existence; [and
that they] were never provided with a copy of the admission forms." 17
6
The court focused on the question of whether there was an enforceable
agreement to arbitrate.' 77 The court noted that "[tihere [was] nothing in
the record to show, and the plaintiffs did not contend, that [the] hospital
would have denied Wheeler admission if he had declined to agree to the
[arbitration provision]."'78 The court also noted that California has a public
policy in favor of arbitration, but only if it is voluntarily agreed to by all of
the parties. I79 Thus, the issue as the court saw it was whether, under the
circumstances, Wheeler had voluntarily agreed to arbitrate. °
The court recognized that the hospital admission agreement possessed
all of the characteristics of a contract of adhesion.' The court described ad-
hesion contracts as "standardized contract forms offered to consumers ... on
essentially a 'take it or leave it' basis without... a realistic opportunity to
bargain and under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the
desired product or services except by acquiescing in the form contract."
'
1s2
The court cited the following language from Tunki:
The would-be patient is in no position to reject the proffered agreement, to
bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agreement to find another hospital.
The admission room of a hospital contains no bargaining table where, as
in a private business transaction, the parties can debate the terms of their
contract. As a result, we cannot but conclude that the instant agreement
manifested the characteristics of the so-called adhesion contract .... 
1
83
The court then stated that "[t]o the ordinary person, admission to a hos-
pital is an anxious, stressful, and frequently a traumatic experience."'8 4 As
a result, the patient cannot reasonably be expected to read the printed
agreement in detail much less to fully comprehend its terms. ss "[A] patient
is [usually] directed by his treating doctor to be admitted to the hospital
175 Id. at 779.
176 Id. at 780.
177 Id. at 781-82.
178 Id. at 781.
179 Id. at 782.
i8o Id.
181 Id. at 783.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 786.
I85 Id.
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where the doctor enjoys staff privileges."186 The court noted that unless the
patient is "advised by his doctor to the contrary, [he] normally feels he has
no choice but to seek admission to the designated hospital and to accede
to all of the terms and conditions for admission, including the signing of all
forms presented to him." 87
The court concluded that "[a] patient like Mr. Wheeler realistically has
no choice but to seek admission to the hospital to which he has been di-
rected by his physician and to sign the printed forms necessary to gain
admission."'18 To believe otherwise would, according to the court, "require
us to ignore the stress, anxiety, and urgency which ordinarily beset a pa-
tient seeking hospital admission." ,89 The court found that Wheeler was not
bound by the arbitration provision.90
In Phoenix Baptist Hospital & Medical Center, Inc. v. Aiken, Thomas Aiken
took his wife Patricia Aiken to the hospital for emergency medical care.' 9' At
the time of his wife's admission, Thomas signed a "Financial Agreement"
which provided in part as follows:
The undersigned agrees (whether signing as agent, representative, or as pa-
tient, and whether or not insured or a member of a health maintenance orga-
nization) that, in consideration of the services to be rendered to the patient,
he or she is hereby individually obligated to pay the account of the hospital
in accordance with the regular rates and terms of the hospital unless other-
wise agreed in writing by the hospital corporation .... Should the hospital
account be referred for collection, the undersigned agrees to pay reasonable
collection expenses, counsel fees, and court costs .... 192
The issue in the case was whether the agreement was enforceable such
that Thomas was liable from his personal assets for the medical services
provided to his wife. 93 He claimed the agreement was unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable.194 The court, in discussing the procedural uncon-
scionability of the agreement, noted that Thomas hurriedly "signed the
agreement under extremely stressful circumstances without having had the
terms of the agreement explained to him."'' 95 The court held that the trier
of fact could have concluded "that Thomas did not understand the implica-
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 789.
189 Id.
19o Id. at 790.
191 Phoenix Baptist Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Aiken, 877 Pzd 1345, 1348 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994).
192 Id. at 1347.
193 Id. at 1347-48.
194 Id. at 1349.
195 Id.
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tions of the agreement, or that he felt he had no choice but to immediately
sign the preprinted form."'96 In denying the hospital's request for summary
judgment, the court concluded that there was a material issue of fact as to
the unconscionability of the procedure used to obtain the agreement.
97
Finally, in St. John's Episcopal Hospital v. McAdoo, the issue concerned
whether Charles McAdoo's signature on a standard form contract prepared
by the hospital bound him to pay his estranged wife's medical fees.' 98 The
court noted the basic contract law principle that "a literate, competent
adult... is ordinarily held legally responsible for his contractual obligations,
once ... he has signed the contract."'99 The court went on to note that "there
are circumstances under which a reasonable person might sign a contract,
without reading or understanding it, so that requiring adherence to its
terms would be grossly unfair." 2° The court then recognized the trauma
and anxiety experienced by those confronted with an emergency medical
crisis and concluded that a hospital emergency room is certainly not a place
where a reasonable person could be expected to exercise "calm and dispas-
sionate judgment..20' A reasonable person, according to the court, would
give a hospital admission contract at most "cursory attention. ' ' 202 The court
concluded that a hospital "should not be permitted to enforce a contractual
obligation entered into under such tension-laden circumstances." 203
Hospital admission contracts relating to necessary medical services are
procedurally unconscionable even if the medical services are not sought on
an emergency basis. In a case where a patient's doctor has determined that
hospitalization will be necessary for the treatment of the patient's medical
condition, but the treatment is not on an emergency basis, the patient may
visit the hospital days or even a week or two before admission.2 4 At this
initial visit, the patient may sign his admission forms and be provided with
copies of them.2 0 5 In addition, in this somewhat more relaxed setting of
admissions (rather than the emergency room), the hospital staff may take
more time to explain, and the patient may be better able to understand the
196 Id. at 1350.
197 Id. at 1351.
198 St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.zd 935,936 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978).
599 Id.
2oo Id.
zoI Id. at 937.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 But cf St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1978) (discussing the stress created when a patient is not given enough time to read closely or
discuss medical admission forms).
205 But cf Wheeler 133 Cal. Rptr. at 786 (discussing the fact that the arbitration option
contained in the admission forms was not explained nor was the patient provided with a copy
of the form.).
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terms of the admission contract.2 6 Theoretically it may be possible, though
practically unlikely, for the patient to have the admission contract reviewed
by counsel after the initial visit to admissions but prior to the patient's ac-
tual admission to the hospital.207 Thus, it is possible, though still unlikely,
that the patient in this nonemergency context may be fully aware that he is
obligating himself to pay the hospital's "full charge," and even aware that
because he is uninsured, the "full charge" is many times greater than the
amount an insured patient would be expected to pay for the same medical
care."° Even if the patient is fully aware of the provisions in the admission
contract and their meaning before signing it, the admission contract is still
procedurally unconscionable. The reasons for this are several, but they all
spring from the nature of necessary medical services.2: 9 Necessary medical
services are vital, such that even if the patient has some choice as to timing,
he has no real choice concerning his need for the service.2I ° A patient's hos-
pital choice is determined largely by his doctor.,," That is, the patient goes
to the hospital chosen by his doctor because his doctor is on the staff of this
hospital.z12 Moreover, regardless of which hospital the patient is directed to,
virtually all will require his agreement to pay "full charges," which stems
from the Medicare and Medicaid requirements to which virtually all hos-
pitals are subject.1 3 Thus, even in the case of "planned" as opposed to
"emergency" necessary medical services, hospital admission agreements
are procedurally unconscionable.214
B. Case Law: Substantive Unconsionability
Substantive unconscionability is often defined in terms of oppression, over-
reaching, and unfair surprise.215 A hospital admission contract is likely to be
found unfair if it contains harsh terms contrary to common expectation and
2o6 Id.
207 See Richard M. Alderman, The Business of Medicine-Health Care Providers, Physicians,
andtheDeceptive Trade Practices Act, 26 Hous. L. REV. 109, 113-14, 140 (1989) (The author notes
that the health care consumer "view[s] the industry as a 'profession' separate from the average
business, and often places unqualified trust in the physician," is reluctant to question any as-
pect of treatment, including billing and collection, and is much, much more focused on results
than costs, especially at the time of seeking treatment).
zo8 See generally Lagnado, supra note 12 (discussing a California law requiring disclosure
of charge masters by hospitals in the state).
209 See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes Io4-67 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
215 Seesupra notes 8o-io 3 and accompanying text.
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common fairness that have been effectively forced on the patient.1 6 For
example, in Wheeler, the hospital admission contract included a term requir-
ing the patient to arbitrate any claims against the hospital.27 In refusing
to enforce the provision, the court concluded that it represented an unfair
surprise.21s
The manifest objective of a medical entity in including an arbitration clause
is to avoid a jury trial and thereby hopefully minimize losses for any medical
malpractice and correspondingly to hold down the amount of any recovery
by the patient.... The law ought not to decree a forfeiture of such a valu-
able right where the patient has not been made aware of the existence of an
arbitration provision or its implications. Absent notification and at least some
explanation, the patient cannot be said to have exercised a 'real choice' in
selecting arbitration over litigation. We conclude that in order to be binding,
an arbitration clause incorporated in a hospital's 'CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION'
form should be called to the patient's attention and he should be given a
reasonable explanation of its meaning and effect, including an explanation
of any options available to the patient.119
In Wheeler, the court's concern with the patient's awareness of the terms
of the admission contract makes sense, because the agreement allowed
the patient to opt out of arbitration by initialing the form or objecting to
arbitration within thirty days of discharge.2" However, hospital admission
contracts do not allow patients to opt out of agreeing to pay full charges.
Moreover, the Wheeler court recognized that the context of hospital admis-
sion is such that unexpected or harsh terms in hospital admission contracts
may be unfair even if the patient is aware of them because the patient has
no choice but to agree."' The Wheeler court stated:
A patient like Mr. Wheeler realistically has no choice but to seek admission
to the hospital to which he has been directed by his physician and to sign
the printed forms necessary to gain admission. To posit otherwise would
require us to ignore the stress, anxiety, and urgency which ordinarily beset a
patient seeking hospital admission'
21
Both the Aiken3 and McAdoo22 4 courts applied similar reasoning to con-
clude that provisions of hospital admission contracts may be unenforce-
216 Seesupra notes 8o-Io3 and accompanying text.
217 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 780 (1976).
218 Id. at 786.
219 Id. at 786.
zzo Id. at 780.
221 Id. at 789-9o.
222 Id.
223 Phoenix Baptist Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Aiken, 877 P.2d 1345 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994).
224 St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d 935 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978).
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able. 2 5 Both cases involved provisions that imposed personal liability on the
signer even though the party signing the agreement was not the patient.22
6
Aiken took his wife to the hospital after she suffered a heart attack and
signed the admission form without reading it.227 Likewise, McAdoo took
his estranged wife to the hospital fearing she was near death and did not
read carefully or question the admission forms he signed.221 In addressing
the enforceability of the provisions imposing personal liability, both courts
focused on the reasonable expectations of the party signing the agree-
ment. 2 9 Both courts noted that as a result of the circumstances surrounding
hospital admissions the signer could not be expected to give the written
agreement careful consideration.230 Thus, the courts focused on whether
the provisions included in the admissions contracts were ones that a rea-
sonable person would expect to find in such a contract.23' Aiken involved an
appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the hospital. The
court noted, "[w]e must consider, then, whether it was beyond Thomas'
reasonable expectation to have liability imposed upon his separate prop-
erty.11232 The court concluded that the "evidence creates a material issue of
fact as to Thomas' reasonable expectation."233 In addition, in McAdoo, the
court discussed "whether a reasonable person should have expected to find
such a clause in the particular instrument he was signing."34 The court con-
cluded that the clause was beyond reasonable expectations and held that
the hospital "should not be permitted to enforce a contractual obligation
entered into under such tension-laden circumstances. '235
The agreement of a patient to pay a hospital's "full charges" or "regular
rates" sounds reasonable. However, closer examination reveals that, in fact,
the patient is agreeing to a grossly exorbitant and unfair price that on aver-
age is 365 percent of the hospital's CoSt236 and that is set with little, if any,
reference to the value or cost of goods and services sold.237 Further, it is a
price that is set to be discounted and is in fact heavily discounted ninety-
five percent of the time.238 Moreover, most patients are expected to pay
225 See infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
227 Aiken, 877 P.2d at 1347-48.
228 McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.zd at 936.
229 Aiken, 877 Pzd at 1349-50; McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d. at 937.
23o Aiken, 877 P2d at 1349-50; McAdoo, 405 N.YS.2d at 937.
231 Aiken, 877 P.zd at 1349-50; McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
232 Aiken, 877 P.2d at 1349.
233 Id.
234 McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S.zd at 937.
235 Id.
236 See supra notes Io4-67 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes io4-67 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 5o4-67 and accompanying text.
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only a fraction of this full price for the same goods and services.239 In effect,
the uninsured patient, by agreeing to pay "full charges," is agreeing to pay
a huge premium for all goods and services received. 240 Such an agreement
is well beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person and is
grossly and shockingly unfair.241
V. ANALYSIS: UNCONSCIONABILITY AND HOSPITAL ADMISSION AGREEMENTS
THAT REQUIRE UNINSURED PATIENTS TO PAY FULL CHARGES
In all price unconscionability cases the same obvious and troubling ques-
tions arise. 42 First, why would anyone agree (assuming there has been no
fraud, duress, iistake, etc., which is a reasonable assumption or else un-
conscionability would not be needed to invalidate the contract)43 to pay a
price that is grossly unfair?244 That is, if there is one term above all others
that the buyer is likely to be acutely aware of, it is the price.14s If the price is
oppressive, why did the buyer not refuse to agree and walk away from the
offered bargain?4 6 This is especially troublesome if the oppressive price is
239 See supra notes Io4-67 and accompanying text.
240 See Klock, supra note 13, at 327-33 (discussing how calling a lower price for some
consumers a "discount" is simply marketing; the economic reality is that all other consumers
are in fact paying a premium).
241 See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501,
508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appealdenied, 847 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 2004) (noting that the important
question regarding a hospital's published rates is not whether they are higher or lower than
other hospitals' published rates, but whether they reflect the amount the hospital actually
receives for its services, and since the hospital rarely receives its published rates, those rates
cannot be considered the value of the benefit conferred.).
242 See Darr, supra note 48, at 1822 ("Of all the terms in a contract, the one most assur-
edly understood by the buyer is the price term."). Darr goes on to note that "neither tradi-
tional rules of contract nor the classic economics on which they are based support the doctrine
of price unconscionability." Id. at 1823. However, the assumptions of classic economics do not
always apply in the real world. Thus, in some situations, like hospital admission, problems
with the market's pricing mechanisms arise and remain uncorrected by the market.
243 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcoN.
293, 302, 304 (1975) ("Ideally, the unconscionability doctrine protects against fraud, duress
and incompetence, without demanding specific proof of any of them.") (also noting that
the unconscionability doctrine can be useful when proof required for fraud etc. is difficult);
Richard Craswell, Property Rules andLiability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 40-41 (1993) (unconscionability may be used to deal with situations of im-
perfect consent); Klock, supra note 13, at 341 (discussing the usefulness of unconscionability
because "[tihere is no such thing as... almost duress, or partial capacity .... Our system does
not contemplate varying degrees of valid consent.").
z44 See Darr, supra note 48, at 1822-23.
245 Id. at 1822.
246 However, Darr does recognize an exception in the case of necessities or in cases
where reference price information is not readily available. Id. at 1832-41.
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defined in terms of being higher than the price offered by other sellers in
the same area.2 47 That is, why didn't the buyer choose to buy from a differ-
ent seller?24
s
The other troubling question in excessive price cases is how the court
is to determine a "fair" price. 249 To find that the contract price is excessive
and to provide an appropriate remedy, the court must determine a "fair"
price for the contract.2 50 Even if the court can determine that the contract
price is grossly unfair (for example, where there is price discrimination),'5
and explain why a reasonable buyer would agree to pay a grossly unfair
price in the first place (for example, where the contract terms are compli-
cated, obtuse, and confusing),252 to resolve the case the court must some-
how determine a "fair" price for the contract at issue.53 In general, having
courts substitute their ex post judgment for the parties' ex ante agreement
is a bad idea.254
247 Seesupra notes 96-102 (defining excessive price in terms of the price charged for like
goods in the community).
248 Or more to the point: why is the buyer worthy of judicial protection if he chose not
to protect himself? Of course, in the hospital admission contract cases the buyer has no choice
but to sign the forms presented. See supra notes 189-215 and accompanying text.
249 Determining the fair value of anything is difficult. See I ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 127, 540-42 (1963) ("Very generally we speak of'value' as if it were
definite and exact, an easily ascertainable amount of money. In fact, it is always variable, al-
ways a matter on which opinions may differ, and frequently one that is very difficult to esti-
mate."). It is no wonder then that courts usually leave price determinations to the parties.
250 Id.
251 When the seller sells to other buyers at a lower price with no cost justification, the
higher price is clearly excessive. See Klock, supra note 13, at 358-361.
252 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,447 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(confusing terms in contract).
253 In the case of hospital admission contracts the fair price is determined by the hospi-
tal itself (i.e., the average charge the hospital receives from governmental agencies and insur-
ance companies for the services rendered to the patient), and the court is not forced to set the
price. See infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STA. L. REV. 211, 212 (1995) (noting that a contract is based on the "premise that in making
a bargain a contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his subjective
expected utility." The author further states:
Parties are normally the best judges of their own utility, and normally
reveal their determinations of utility in their promises. Bargain prom-
ises are normally made in a deliberative manner for personal gain, and
promises so made should normally be kept. Bargains normally create
value, enable the parties to plan their future conduct reliably, allocate
commodities to their highest-valued uses, and best distribute the factors
of production ....
Id. at 211-12; see also Klock, supra note 13, at 347 (listing the undesirable consequences of
such action, which include: creating uncertainty as to the enforceability of contracts generally,
denying the protected class of people access to the contracted for goods or services, and loss
of incentive for people to protect themselves).
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The law deals with the first question by requiring both procedural and
substantive unconscionability for a contract to be invalidated.55 That is, to
find an excessive price contract unenforceable due to unconscionability,
the price must be oppressively high, and there must be some defect in the
bargaining process.25 6 This defect will not meet all of the requirements of
other policing, formation, or disclosure common law doctrines designed to
deal with contracting process problems, but there must be some process
problem.257 For example, in many price cases the buyer's behavior is ex-
plained by the fact that the buyer was unaware of the true price because
it was hidden from him in the obtuse terms of the contract, complicated
finance charges, hidden fees, or all three.25 8 Commentators have also sug-
gested that buyers may lack appropriate information regarding a reference
price at the time of contracting and thus may not be aware of the great dis-
parity between the contract price and a fair price.259 Certainly, this reasoning
can be applied to a patient's agreement to pay "full charges."'260 That is, the
patient does not know the actual dollar amount that he is agreeing to pay.26,
Moreover, the patient does not have the necessary information regarding a
reference price;262 thus, he does not know that he is agreeing to pay many
times what other patients pay for the same goods and services.2
63
However, the usefulness of this analysis in the hospital admissions con-
text is limited because it implies that if only the buyer had known how
grossly unfair the price was, he never would have agreed to the contract.
This conclusion is erroneous in the context of hospital admissions. Patients
generally do not understand what they are agreeing to when they sign a
hospital admission contract that includes their agreement to pay the hospi-
tal's "full charges." 64 However, even if they did, they would still sign the
admission contract, because they are purchasing a necessary service, and
they do not have any practical ability to go elsewhere for this necessity 65
For example, in Tunkl,z6 the admission agreement provided that the
patient "releases... the hospital from any and all liability for the negligent
255 See supra notes 54-103 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 54-103 and accompanying text.
257 Seesupra notes 54-103 and accompanying text.
258 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.zd 445,447 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
For more cases, see Darr, supra note 48, at 1850.
259 See Darr, supra note 48, at 1833-39.
26o See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
266 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees. ' ' 267 Tunki was not decided
on the basis of unconscionability, but the court's reasoning and conclusions
concerning hospital admission contracts are relevant to the unconscionabil-
ity analysis. The court noted, "[tihat the services of the hospital to those
members of the public who are in special need of the particular skill of its
staff and facilities constitute a practical and crucial necessity is hardly open
to question." 6s With regard to the terms of the hospital admission contract,
the court concluded that "the hospital certainly exercises a decisive advan-
tage in bargaining." 269 The court further stated "[tlhe would-be patient is in
no position to reject the proffered agreement, to bargain with the hospital,
or in lieu of agreement to find another hospital."' 70 The TunkI court recog-
nized that even if the patient understands perfectly what he is signing and
the legal implications thereof, and even if he concludes in his own mind
that the terms are grossly unfair, he still has no choice but to agree.27' Even
if the actual price to be paid and the reference price to compare it were
available to the patient at the time of the signing of the hospital admission
agreement, the legal conclusion that the agreement to pay "full charges"
is grossly unfair would not change. 72 The problem here is not limited to a
lack of disclosure. The problem is that the full charges are discriminatory
and are simply too high, especially for something as necessary as medical
services. These high prices occur and remain unchecked because the cir-
cumstances surrounding hospital admission and pricing result in a market
failure such that the problem cannot be solved by the market.2 73 Thus, the
courts must employ the flexible tool of unconscionability to prevent the
injustice and unfairness that the market, because of its failure, allows to
occur.
74
Hospitals set their full charges at such a high level because they ex-
pect to have the charges discounted.2 7 5 Recall that only uninsured patients
are expected to pay these full charges and that less than five percent of
patients ever pay the "full charges. ' 276 Moreover, hospitals do not simply
agree to discount their "full charges" and charge a reasonable price to the
uninsured because they fear that under the federal regulations governing
Medicare and Medicaid (a hospital's primary source of funds), discount-
267 Id. at 442.
z68 Id. at 447.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 14-67 and accompanying text.
274 See Darr, supra note 48, at 1841 ("Under these circumstances [market failure], the
courts would intervene to protect consumers from unfair prices and practices.").
275 See supra notes 114-67 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 1 14-67 and accompanying text.
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ing for anyone, even for the uninsured, could drastically reduce their reim-
bursement from Medicare, Medicaid, contract insurers and HMOs.277 From
a hospital's point of view, there is no compelling reason to take such an
enormous risk.
The result is that the uninsured are victimized much more by circum-
stance than by intent. Uninsured patients like Shipman27 or Nix279 are
charged such high amounts almost by mistake.z8° The hospital's charges
were not set with any real consideration that an individual would actu-
ally pay the charge.28' The full charges are set to be discounted. s25 They
are set so high because they must allow the hospital to receive sufficient
revenue to continue to operate after the full charges have been reduced
by an average of sixty percent. 8 3 However, the fact that the uninsured are
not intended victims does not mean that they are any less victimized by
hospital billing. 84
The second problem in price unconscionability cases is that judicial
price-setting is certainly inconsistent with a free market and is usually to be
avoided.285 This is because a court is generally ill equipped to determine a
reasonable value or fair price.286 However, the unique circumstances of hos-
pital billing allows for the complete avoidance of the judicial price-setting
problem.18 7 The court is not required to set the price because the hospitals
277 See supra notes 114-67 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
28o There is no intent on the part of hospitals to treat the uninsured unfairly. In fact,
some hospitals claim to want to reduce the amount they charge to the uninsured but feel
they can't under existing federal rules. See Lucette Lagnado, Medical Shift: Hospitals WillGive
Price Breaks To Uninsured, If Medicare Agrees, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at Ai (hospitals con-
cede many charges aren't fair to the needy but blame federal rules); cf. Lucette Lagnado,
HHS Chief Rebukes Hospitals for their Treatment of Uninsured, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2oo4, at Ai
(HHS Secretary claims hospitals may cut charges to uninsured "without fear of government
reprisals").
281 See supra notes io4-67 and accompanying text.
282 Seesupra notes 1o4-67 and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 1o4-67 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes Io4-67 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 249.
286 See supra note 249.
287 As courts have noted, the reasonable value of a hospital's goods and services is the
average amount the hospital actually collects for such goods and services. This amount may
be readily ascertained by examination of the hospital's contracts with governmental agencies,
HMO's and contract insurers. See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives,
Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 5o9-io (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appealdenied, 847 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 2004) (hos-
pital may not recover billed "full" charges but may recover average collection rate for years in
question); see generally River Park Hosp., Inc. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tenn., Inc., 173 S-W.3d
43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
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have, in fact, already set a reasonable price.211 An uninsured patient should
be required to pay the average amount the hospital actually receives and
accepts as full payment from Medicare, Medicaid, contract insurers, and
HMOs for the diagnostic code that applies to the medical goods and ser-
vices received by the patient.28 9 This amount can be easily and objectively
determined and does not require court involvement in judicial price-set-
ting.219
An uninsured patient's agreement to pay a hospital's full charges is un-
conscionable regardless of whether the uninsured patient is rich or poor.29'
The factors that result in the unconscionability of such provisions when
applied to poor uninsured patients apply equally well to wealthy uninsured
patients.292 The unconscionability springs from several factors.93 First, the
medical services are necessary and thus the patient, rich or poor, has no
choice but to sign the forms presented by the hospital. 94 Second, the pa-
tient, rich or poor, has no idea from the agreement that he is agreeing to pay
a huge premium over the amount paid for the same goods and services by
insured patients.295 Finally, the price discrimination practiced by hospitals
and their setting of "full charges" at excessively high levels unrelated to
their costs or a reasonable profit is grossly unfair and shocking.96 All.of
these factors apply to wealthy and poor uninsured patients alike.
297
VI. CONCLUSION
Provisions in hospital admission agreements that require uninsured pa-
tients to pay a hospital's "full charges" are unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable.91 Such provisions are procedurally unconscionable, be-
cause with regard to necessary medical services, the patient has no choice
288 Seesupra note 287 and accompanying text.
289 See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
290 See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
291 That is, necessary medical services are necessary whether the patient is rich or poor.
A rich patient has no more knowledge than a poor patient regarding hospital billing practices.
Thus, a rich patient is no more likely to know that by agreeing to pay full charges or list prices
he is agreeing to pay a huge premium. See Klock, supra note 13, at 382 ("Sometimes the people
discriminated against are poorer and less educated, are affluent or educated, or are corporate
entities. Does it make a difference? If so, is that not analogous to suggesting that it is accept-
able to steal from insurance companies, but not from individuals?").
292 See supra notes 242-91 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 242-91 and accompanying text.
294 Seesupra notes 242-91 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 242-91 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 242-91 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 242-91 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 1-19, 242-91 and accompanying text.
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but to sign the forms required by the hospital for admission. 299 Moreover,
uninsured patients have no idea that by agreeing to pay the hospital's "full
charges," they are in fact agreeing to pay a huge premium over the amount
required to be paid for the exact goods and services rendered to insured
patients.
30°
An uninsured patient's agreement to pay a hospital's full charges is sub-
stantively unconscionable because the hospital is engaged in price discrim-
ination.3°1 That is, hospitals are charging a huge premium to the uninsured
with no justification.32 The premium is the result of the excessively high
full charges reflected on the charge masters of hospitals, which in turn are
the result of the often perverse rules and regulations associated with the
third-party reimbursement system.30 3 In fact, the victimization of the unin-
sured seems to be unintentional. 3°4 Nevertheless, the uninsured are victims
and need protection. 305 While clearly the proper solution to the problem is
an overhaul of the rules and regulations of the third-party reimbursement
system,3' in the meantime the flexible doctrine of unconscionability can
provide significant protection to the uninsured.37 Courts should use the
doctrine to ensure that the most the uninsured are required to pay for nec-
essary medical services is the average amount that the hospital providing
the service accepts from third-party payors for the diagnostic code relating
to the goods and services provided to the patient.3 8
299 See supra notes 6i-8o, 168-214 and accompanying text.
300 Seesupra notes 1o4-67 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 80-105, 215-41 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes io4-67 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes Io4-67 and accompanying text.
304 See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
305 See supra note 131.
306 See supra note 113.
307 See supra notes 242-91 and accompanying text.
308 See supra notes 287-9o and accompanying text.
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